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Leverage and Beliefs: Personal Experience and  
Risk-Taking in Margin Lending†
By Peter Koudijs and  Hans-Joachim Voth*
What determines  risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage 
in financial markets? Using unique archival data on collateralized 
lending, we show that personal experience can affect individual 
 risk-taking and aggregate leverage. When an investor syndicate 
speculating in Amsterdam in 1772 went bankrupt, many lenders were 
exposed. In the end, none of them actually lost money. Nonetheless, 
only those at risk of losing money changed their behavior markedly; 
they lent with much higher haircuts. The rest continued largely as 
before. The differential change is remarkable since the distress was 
public knowledge. Overall leverage in the Amsterdam stock market 
declined as a result. (JEL D12, D14, D83, G11, G21)
Leverage in financial markets is not constant over time. Lending is typically 
 procyclical: high and increasing in good times, and much lower when asset prices 
fall (Adrian and Shin 2010). For example, when the stock market crashed after 
Lehman’s bankruptcy in 2008, haircuts1 increased sharply and the volume of col-
lateralized lending collapsed (Gorton and Metrick 2012; Krishnamurthy, Nagel, 
and Orlov 2014).  Procyclical leverage cycles affect the  risk-bearing capacity of 
financial intermediaries and can contribute to large changes in asset prices (He and 
Krishnamurthy 2013).2 The source of these important changes is less clear.3
1 The difference between the asset’s market value and the loan amount, the reciprocal of leverage. 
2 Resulting changes in asset prices are observationally equivalent to changes in risk aversion, which contribute 
importantly to price swings in the aggregate (Campbell and Cochrane 1999; Cochrane 2011). 
3 Regulatory and technical constraints—such as value-at-risk (VAR) limits—can help to rationalize large 
shifts in credit provided to financial markets (Adrian and Shin 2010; Geanakoplos 2010). Several contributions 
to the literature on  procyclical leverage argue that volatility of asset prices is greater in bad states of the world 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2005; Vayanos 2004). Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) rationalize this finding in a 
setting with heterogeneous agents. 
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We argue that changes in beliefs on the part of lenders can explain shifts in 
 market-wide leverage, and that personal experience is an important determinant of 
these changes. Our argument is related to a literature examining the effects of indi-
vidual experience on behavior in financial markets. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) 
demonstrate that individuals who lived through the Great Depression invested sys-
tematically less in equities, even after controlling for age, gender, and income. Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) show that during the recent financial crisis, Italian 
investors became markedly more risk averse. In an experimental setting, inducing 
fear can reduce  risk-taking (Cohn et al. 2015). Key challenges in this literature are 
to show that changes in attitudes can affect aggregate  risk-bearing capacity, even in 
markets with sophisticated participants, and that changes in behavior are not simply 
a reflection of lower wealth.4
In this paper, we show that adverse experiences can change beliefs, leading 
to large increases in haircuts in a sophisticated and liquid loan market, creating 
 procyclical leverage in the aggregate. Importantly, lenders’ personal willingness to 
take risks declined even without individual losses. Using  hand-collected data from 
notary archives, we focus on margin loans in the  eighteenth century Amsterdam 
stock market. This setting has two key advantages. First, loans were collateralized 
with securities that had readily observed market prices, and leverage can easily be 
measured by the haircuts imposed. Second, because loan contracts were negotiated 
in an  over-the-counter (OTC) market, we can identify the impact of differences 
in lenders’ personal experience on the  cross section of haircuts. We focus on one 
particular episode of financial distress around Christmas 1772. The Seppenwolde 
syndicate speculated in East India Company stock. Lenders exposed to the syndicate 
were at risk of significant financial losses, but escaped unharmed. Uncertainty was 
resolved within a matter of weeks. Financiers who had lent to the syndicate before 
became more conservative. Before the crisis, collateral requirements of exposed 
lenders were indistinguishable from the rest of the market. Suddenly, after the 
Seppenwolde bankruptcy, lenders involved with the syndicate only extended loans 
with markedly higher haircuts (panel A of Figure 1). Their average down payment 
rose from 20 to almost 30 percent within six months. Other lenders—not at risk of 
personal losses—conducted business as usual.
Major lenders to the stricken syndicate changed their behavior, influencing aggre-
gate market conditions. The tightening of collateral requirements in the Amsterdam 
secured lending market after Christmas 1772 is fully explained by former financiers 
of the syndicate lending with higher haircuts. At the same time, interest rates on loans 
extended by both groups of lenders remained unchanged (panel B of Figure 1), and 
exposed lenders did not exit the sample at a higher rate. Other margins of adjustment 
point toward lower  risk-taking: affected lenders reduced their volume of margin lend-
ing overall and started to lend to less risky borrowers. Importantly, although haircuts 
of exposed and  non-exposed lenders eventually began to converge (after a year), the 
effect remains visible for as long as we have data: a  one-off, large shock changed the 
behavior of major players substantially and for an extended period.
4 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) find no correlation with wealth, consumption patterns, or other sources 
of risk. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) conclude that wealth fluctuations only have minor effects on risk tolerance. 
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Why did borrowers not simply shift toward lenders who were not affected by the 
Seppenwolde bankruptcy? There was no centralized exchange for loans and borrow-
ers had to search for potential lenders. Who they matched with depended on who 
happened to have liquidity available at the right moment. Our identification therefore 
relies on the accidental timing of liquidity needs. After Christmas 1772, unaffected 
lenders were generally in short supply, and borrowers had to settle for higher hair-
cuts if their funding need happened to coincide with available funds in the hands of 
an exposed lender. In other words, the differential response of haircuts is observable 
because of the  search-and-matching process between lenders and borrowers. We 
rationalize these changes in an OTC market version of Geanakoplos’ (2003) model 
of collateralized lending, emphasizing investor heterogeneity. Optimists borrow to 
buy a risky asset while pessimists lend. In equilibrium, speculation in risky securi-
ties is financed by contracts involving minimal risk to the lenders; the cost of risky 
contracts would be prohibitive from the perspective of the borrower.5 Fluctuations 
in haircuts reflect changes in the level of disagreement between investors about the 
payoff of an asset or shifts in investor characteristics, such as the share of optimists 
and pessimists.6 By only affecting one set of investors—and their lenders—the dis-
tress in the Amsterdam stock market in 1772/1773 increased lender heterogeneity. 
Having only narrowly escaped from losses, affected lenders became more pessi-
mistic; consistent with Geanakoplos (2003), they demanded higher haircuts. In our 
5 In the Geanakoplos model, agents with more optimistic beliefs want to lever up to invest in the asset. 
Pessimistic agents do not want to hold the asset directly, but are willing to lend to the optimists on the collateral of 
the asset. The equilibrium contract turns out to be risk free. The haircut is set such that even in the worst possible 
state of the world lenders are fully repaid. From a borrower’s perspective it is prohibitively expensive to contract a 
risky loan with a lower haircut—he expects to always pay a high risk premium, even in states of the world where 
the more pessimistic lender expects him to default. 
6 Simsek (2013) uses a  Geanakoplos-style model to analyze the effects of more general types of disagreement. 
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historical setting, personal experience changed behavior, generating  procyclical 
leverage in the aggregate.
We can rule out several alternative interpretations: losses among intermediaries, 
which may have played an important role in the recent crisis (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen 2005; Adrian and Shin 2010), were unimportant.7 Also, the price fall was 
largely exogenous, driven by the arrival of negative news about fundamentals in 
Bengal. Lenders at risk of losing money then reduced the riskiness of their lending 
by raising collateral requirements. Despite the decline in effective funding for spec-
ulators, the price decline was limited and reversed quickly; no loss spirals followed 
the sharp shift in haircuts. Because lenders did not suffer any losses, higher haircuts 
cannot reflect an increase in ( wealth-dependent) risk aversion. Finally, increases in 
haircuts were not driven by regulatory constraints, such as VAR limits, which can 
drive fire sales (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009).
Our research contributes to the literature on asset prices and heterogeneous 
beliefs more generally. Differences in beliefs can be important for asset pricing 
(Miller 1977; Harrison and Kreps 1978; Jarrow 1980; Hong and Stein 2007). Where 
these differences come from is an area of active research. Agents may have access to 
different information sets (Brunnermeier 2001; Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2005a)8 or 
have different beliefs as a result of their own experiences. The latter is often called 
reinforcement learning (Camerer and Ho 1999; Erev and Roth 1998). A number 
of contributions look at the impact of experience on decision making in financial 
markets (Choi et al. 2009; Greenwood and Nagel 2009; Kaustia and Knüpfer 2008; 
and  Vissing-Jorgenson 2003).9 Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2016) show that both 
the Great Depression and high inflation in the 1970s influenced expectations and 
behavior. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) argue that experiencing a financial 
crisis can induce a big change in risk appetite. In the same spirit, Heath and Tversky 
(1991) conclude that the willingness to take risks declines sharply with distrust in 
one’s own judgment. Murfin (2012) shows that banks impose stricter loan covenants 
when they suffer losses on their loan portfolios. More generally, our work connects 
with research on the determinants of attitudes and beliefs.10
Our paper also contributes to the literature using historical data on haircuts as a 
measure of expectations. Rappoport and White (1994) argue that increasing mar-
gin requirements in the  run-up to the 1929 crash on the New York Stock Exchange 
reflected growing worries about a coming crash. Temin and Voth (2004) argue that 
haircuts in lending against stock during the South Sea bubble suggest that inves-
tors were “riding” the bubble. Schnabel and Shin (2004) argue that leverage cycles 
created contagion and falling asset prices in the Amsterdam financial crisis of 1763 
(Quinn and Roberds 2015).
7 For a historical example, cf. Schnabel and Shin (2004). 
8 Social networks can shape investor attitudes (Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2005b) and attitudes more generally 
(Acemoglu and Jackson 2015); social capital can boost trust in the stock market (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
2008a). 
9 A formal model of  experience-based belief formation is Piketty (1995). 
10 Graham and Narasimhan (2004) and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) find that corporate managers who 
were born before the Great Depression make more conservative capital structure decisions. The latter authors and 
Benmelech and Frydman (2015) also argue that CEOs with a military background act systematically differently 
as leaders of firms. Personal experience may also be a prime determinant of differences in beliefs. For cultural 
persistence and change more broadly, cf. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2008b).
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We proceed as follows. Section I discusses the historical background. Section II 
summarizes the key features of our model of secured lending. Section III describes 
the data. Section IV presents the main empirical results, and Section V considers a 
variety of extensions and robustness checks. Section VI concludes. Additional mate-
rial is in online Appendices A through G; references to figures and tables starting 
with a corresponding letter can be found there.
I. Historical Background
We first describe the nature of collateralized lending in eighteenth century 
Amsterdam. We briefly explain the East India Company’s situation, and summarize 
evidence on the investment syndicate’s bankruptcy. Finally, we describe how the 
authorities dealt with the crisis.
A. Collateralized Lending in Eighteenth-Century Amsterdam
The market for secured lending in eighteenth century Amsterdam resembles the 
market for margin loans in  modern-day markets. It can be traced back to the early 
seventeenth century (Gelderblom and Jonker 2004). By the 1640s, lending against 
stock had developed into a mature, standardized market (Petram 2014). From the 
eighteenth century onward, English securities were used as collateral, including 
British East India Company stock (EIC). Three features are important. First, lending 
took place largely without intermediaries. Instead, borrowers and lenders interacted 
directly. Second, there was no centralized loan market where uniform lending terms 
were set and the market cleared. Rather, borrowers and lenders had to find each other 
through search. Third, loans were renewable and of standardized length; most loans 
were renewed or terminated after six months (with few exceptions).
Online Appendix A provides the transcript of a typical contract. A borrower 
received money from the lender and in return posted collateral. Ownership took the 
form of an entry in the equity ledger of the company. For secured lending, the security 
was transferred from the account of the borrower to that of the lender. At maturity, the 
loan was either renewed or the lender was repaid, and shares were transferred back to 
the borrower. Contracts stipulated an interest rate, the loan amount, and the collateral. 
Haircuts are the share of the collateral not financed with the loan. Lending agreements 
were often rolled over, i.e., extended by additional (fixed) periods of six months. Our 
data refers to new contracts, not to renewals, which are generally unobservable.
Contracts specified critical price points which triggered margin calls. Suppose 
that a loan was backed by EIC stock with a face value of £1,000 and that the loan 
had an initial 20 percent haircut with the underlying stock trading at 200 percent.11 
A price decline below 190 percent triggered a margin call of £100 to restore the hair-
cut, in this case to 21 percent. Subsequent price declines of 10 percentage points or 
more required additional margin.12 If the borrower was unable to meet margin calls, 
11 In the eighteenth century, prices were quoted as percentage of face (or par) value. 
12 The initial haircut can be disaggregated into two components. The first element is the “distance to margin 
call,” in this case the difference between 200 and 190 percent, or 0.05 of the value of the collateral. The second is 
“distance to loss,” in this case 190 percent to 160 percent or 0.15 of the value of the collateral. If margin calls were 
honored, the “distance to loss” increased by 10 the moment the price fell below 190. 
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the lender had the right to liquidate the borrower’s position. Other creditors had no 
claim on the collateral. Lenders could recoup the loan value and interest only. Any 
surplus had to be remitted to the borrower. If proceeds failed to cover principal and 
interest, the borrower was personally liable for the remaining balance.
The eighteenth century market for collateralized lending was highly decen-
tralized. Direct lending between borrowers and lenders dominated. Only around 
5 percent of transactions featured financial intermediaries. There was consider-
able dispersion in the level of haircuts: the market did not clear at a single haircut. 
Online Appendix Figure B.1 shows that, even conditional on a borrower’s identity 
and the year a transaction took place, there was considerable heterogeneity in hair-
cuts. Repeat lending was not common (other than through, generally unobservable, 
renewals). Rather, the matching of borrowers and lenders took place through search. 
Lenders had to have funds available at the right time. Often, the lender had just 
received the repayment of an earlier loan. The lender Denis Adrien Roest provides 
a good example of this. Roest was a wealthy rentier who frequently offered margin 
loans. Online Appendix Figure B.2 shows how Roest extended loans over time. He 
typically lent again after receiving the repayment of older loans. Since loans ran 
for a multiple of 6 (or 12) months, Roest’s new loans were either extended in May 
(November) or June (December).
Many lenders were rich patricians. Of all lenders, 45 percent lent once in the 
period  1770–1775; another 26 percent lent 2 or 3 times. Only 3 percent of lenders 
lent more than 10 times. Of the borrowers, 38 percent engaged in 1 transaction, and 
another 35 percent in 2 or 3. Only 10 percent borrowed 10 or more times. Over 80 
percent of transactions involved lenders and borrowers who had never done business 
with each other.13 Online Appendix Figure B.3 shows the network of lenders and 
borrowers. Collateral values determine the thickness of the lines. The Seppenwoldes 
borrowed from many financiers. There are few exclusive (or privileged) lending 
relationships; most borrowers have multiple lenders.
B. The EIC in 1772
EIC stock prices had been falling for some time (panel A of Figure 2) prior to 
the events of 1772. The company’s problems originated in Bengal. In 1757 the 
British had defeated the local rulers, allowing the EIC to collect local taxes and 
raise dividends. The EIC stock price increased from about 170 percent to 270 per-
cent. The company squeezed the local population hard, contributing to the infamous 
Bengali famine of  1769–1773, which killed millions while undermining the com-
pany’s financial position.14 Information about the worsened state of the company 
was kept secret. Company directors were unwilling to reduce dividends. Eventually, 
matters came to a head. During the summer of 1772, the EIC had trouble rolling 
13 In online Appendix B we test more formally if random matching of lenders and borrowers can adequately 
explain the nature of lending in our sample. Specifically we calculate the Herfindahl index of every lender’s loan 
portfolio during the  precrisis period. We find that loan portfolios were not more concentrated than one would expect 
based on the random matching of borrowers and lenders. In other words, lenders did not specialize in lending to 
specific individual borrowers. 
14 Nevertheless, the company increased its dividends in March 1771. The shortfall was financed through credit. 
Local company men in India borrowed heavily through short-term bills (drawn on the company in London) and at 
home the Bank of England granted the company substantial loans. 
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over its debt. In September 1772, it was forced to reduce dividends. Stock prices 
 plummeted. After this, more bad news surfaced and stock prices kept falling. In the 
end the government intervened, placing the Company under more direct control 
through the Regulating Act of 1773 (Sutherland 1952). EIC stock prices stayed at 
depressed levels.
C. The Seppenwolde Bankruptcy and Events after Christmas 1772
In 1771, a group of Dutch financiers led by the Van Seppenwolde brothers took 
a large position in EIC stock. The EIC’s price had fallen from 270 percent in 1768 
to about 220 percent. The consortium speculated on a rebound in stock prices. It 
borrowed in Amsterdam to finance its position (totaling almost 6 percent of all out-
standing stock).15 Table 1 gives an overview of the participants of the consortium 
and their holdings around Christmas 1772. Two bankers provided a large share of 
the equity: Clifford and Sons and Abraham ter Borch and Sons. The falling EIC 
price devastated the consortium’s position in 1772. When, in the second half of 
1772, the EIC stock price fell below 200 percent, 190 percent and 180 percent, the 
consortium managed to meet margin calls.16 However, when the EIC stock price fell 
below 170 percent after Christmas 1772, the consortium’s funds were depleted. No 
further margin calls could be honored. All firms involved, including the two banks, 
“broke” and went bankrupt.
15 Other investors went short in 1772, including the English speculator Alexander Fordyce, who was forced to 
close his positions just weeks before prices began to fall. Kindleberger’s survey (2005) linked the bankruptcy of 
the Seppenwolde syndicate with Fordyce and the fall of the Ayr bank, claiming that the crisis began the summer of 
1772. Similarly, Neal (1990) argues that the crisis started in October. This is mistaken. It is only after Christmas 
1772 that problems emerged for the Seppenwolde syndicate. The official bankruptcy date is December 27 (SAA, 
“Stukken betreffende;” Wilson 1941). There is no evidence that Fordyce was linked with the syndicate. Moreover, 
the downfall of Fordyce led to an increase in EIC prices in the short run, improving the syndicate’s position. 
16 SAA, “Stukken betreffende;” SAA, Van den Brink, 10,593–10,613; NA, Staal van Piershil, 381, 386, 396; 
OSA 3710; GAR, 52, 56, 90. Compare also with Wilson (1941) and Sautijn Kluit (1865). 
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From December 28 onward a string of margin calls were issued (Wilson 1941). 
Since these calls were not met, lenders had the right to sell the collateral immedi-
ately. The right panel of Figure 2 shows the timing of these transactions. Gray bars 
indicate the time of the margin calls; the black bars show actual transactions. Many 
sales were delayed; most transactions were completed by the end of January 1773. 
Around the time the margin calls were issued, the median surplus was around 10 per-
cent. Under normal circumstances lenders would have had a comfortable margin to 
liquidate the collateral. However, since many transactions were delayed, and prices 
after Christmas 1772 kept falling, the surplus at liquidation was often lower—many 
lenders liquidated at a surplus of just 2 or 3 percent (see Figure 3).17 Nevertheless, 
the surplus at liquidation was always positive. Although lenders got close, they all 
escaped without losses.
Why lenders waited for several weeks to liquidate the collateral is unclear. At 
best, lenders could hope for repayment of principal and interest. Under the terms 
of the contract, there was no upside for them. It is possible that liquidity on the 
Amsterdam exchange initially dried up. The right panel of Figure 2 provides some 
support for this interpretation; it shows that EIC prices in Amsterdam were sig-
nificantly below those in London. Since there was normally a close relationship 
between the two prices, driven by arbitrage (Koudijs 2016), this suggests local sell-
ing pressure. However, most lenders could afford to sell at a discount of up to 10 
percent without losing a penny. This implies that the market had come to a virtual 
standstill.18
17 The surplus at the time of liquidation cannot be reconstructed for every loan. Corroborating evidence comes 
from Johannes van Seppenwolde’s bankruptcy papers that list all of his assets and liabilities (SAA, Tex den Bondt 
aanvulling 1 en 2, 347). The overview is complete, including everything from real estate to unpaid attorney fees. Not 
a single collateralized lending transaction in English securities led to a claim on the bankrupt estate (instead they all 
ended up on the asset side). Losses due to collateralized loans were pari passu with other claims—this means that 
they cannot have been repaid before the bankruptcy papers were drawn up. For example, a number of collateralized 
loans that had plantation mortgages as collateral did end up as claims in Van Seppenwolde’s bankruptcy papers. 
18 To avoid a general fire sale, the consortium often asked lenders, “in the light of the current circumstances,” 
to hold on to the shares for the time being (SAA, Van Den Brink, 10,602). Since there was no direct upside from 
liquidating at a profit, this equilibrium might have been stable, as long as there were some reputation costs from 
deviating and the surplus remaining on the positions was sufficient. 
Table 1—Positions of the Seppenwolde Syndicate, Christmas 1772
Position (face value)
Member of the syndicate EIC BoE
Hermanus van Seppenwolde £63,600 £49,500
Johannes van Seppenwolde £69,600 £17,000
Clifford & Chevalier £44,500 0
Pieter van Peene £2,000 £4,000
Total £179,700 £70,500
Total outstanding £3,194,080 £10,780,000
 (fraction owned by syndicate) (0.056) (0.007)
Avg. monthly turnover (1770–1772) £196,967 N/A
 (fraction owned by syndicate) (0.912) N/A
Notes: Positions calculated at the end of 1772. Average monthly turnover is based on the turn-
over in the capital books of the respective companies. Actual market turnover would have been 
higher if transactions were netted out before changes in the capital books were made.
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Events were extensively covered in the press. On December 29, the periodical De 
Koopman reported a scarcity of buyers on the exchange. It mentioned that margin 
calls had been issued and that collateral would be sold. In addition, secured loans 
were difficult to obtain, “only on additional security” (De Koopman, p. 295). On 
January 3, the Koopman mentioned more margin calls and that more selling was 
imminent. It expressed the hope that “reality will become more fashionable now 
people are learning these specific lessons” (De Koopman, p. 310). After Christmas 
1772, there was more turmoil on the Amsterdam exchange. The bankruptcy of old 
and renowned banks increased counterparty risk. Nonetheless, the Amsterdam 
market calmed down quickly. On January 14, 1773 the city of Amsterdam set 
up a discount facility where, on the security of domestic government bonds and 
 nonperishable goods, anyone could borrow money. It was hardly used; of 2 to 3 
million guilders available, only 335,000 were lent out. The official records mention 
that setting up the facility alone had restored the “general credit,” and no more bank-
ruptcies occurred.19
How unusual was the behavior of the EIC stock price in 1772? We mea-
sure returns as the log difference of prices over the standard  six-month period: 
 r = ln (  p t /  p t−6 ) . Online Appendix Table B.1 describes the data for three time 
periods—from the beginning of our sample in 1723 to the first half of 1772; the 
Seppenwolde episode; and the full sample from 1723 to 1794. On average, East 
India stock appreciated by 0.5 percent every six months during the  half-century from 
1723 to 1772. Returns during the Seppenwolde episode were dramatically lower, 
with prices declining by an average of 3.4 percent over six month periods between 
early 1770 and January 1773. The standard deviation was only slightly higher, but 
19 SAA, Beleenkamer, 1, 5; Sautijn Kluit (1865); Wilson (1941). 
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Figure 3. Surplus on Loans to Consortium
Notes: Distributions of the surplus on secured loans (the difference between the value of the collateral and the loan), 
right after the issuing of margin calls on December 29 and after the actual execution of the underlying collateral.
3376 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW NOVEMbER 2016
skewness was more negative. The maximum loss over a  six-month horizon increased 
from 25.6 to 35.8 percent. Online Appendix Figure B.4 plots kernel densities. During 
the distress period the weight in the left tail dramatically increased. Prior to the second 
half of 1772, priced dipped by 20 percent or more in only 1.1 percent of all cases. 
Since average haircuts were 20 percent, this implies that in only 1 out of 100 lending 
events, the collateral values fell below the value of a loan. In the period  January  1770 
to January 1773, this frequency increased to over 7 percent.
II. Model
The previous section showed that lenders mostly offered funds to borrowers 
needing credit when one of the lenders’ earlier loans expired. Only a few lenders 
and borrowers could do new business with each other at any one point in time. 
In this section, we model their interactions in a  search-and-matching framework, 
following Geanakoplos (2003) and Simsek (2013). We analyze the case where bor-
rowers’ beliefs remain unchanged, but the beliefs of lenders diverge. More specif-
ically, a fraction of lenders becomes more pessimistic than before. The aim is to 
analyze the impact on haircuts and interest rates. In addition, we establish condi-
tions under which borrowers find it optimal to accept loans from more pessimistic 
lenders. Online Appendix G has the full solution to the model; here we sketch the 
main assumptions and results.
A. Setup and Equilibrium
Apart from a  risk-free storage technology, there is a single risky asset. Following 
Geanakoplos (2003), the asset has a binominal payout.20 There are three types of 
agents in the market  i ∈ { 1, 2, 3} who are all competitive and  risk-neutral but have 
different beliefs about the asset payout. Though they all agree that in the good state 
of the world the asset will pay  r ̅, they disagree about the payoff in the bad state of 
the world:  r _1 <  r _2 <  r _3 . Expected payouts are given by  v i . For simplicity, we 
assume that there are an equal number of type 1 and 2 agents in the market. The 
group of optimists is relatively small so that the equilibrium price never exceeds  v 3 . 
Throughout, we assume that there are shorting restrictions.21
We focus on the case where  v 2 < p <  v 3 . In this scenario, type 3 agents would 
like to buy as much of the asset as possible, while agents 1 and 2 prefer to stay out 
of the market altogether. We assume that type 3 agents have wealth  c 3 . In addition, 
they can borrow from type 1 and 2 agents to increase their asset holdings. We model 
the market for these loans as a search market with matching frictions where borrow-
ers try to find lenders. In their search, they cannot distinguish between type 1 and 2 
lenders. When a borrower and lender meet, they Nash bargain over the surplus of the 
loan contract. The borrower has bargaining power  θ ∈ [ 0, 1 ] .
20 This can be seen as the continuous time limit to a distribution with full support (Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein 
1979). 
21 Short selling in eighteenth century Amsterdam was possible but not accessible to all market participants, 
effectively creating short selling constraints (Koudijs 2015). 
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In this decentralized market, there will be two different sets of lending terms. A 
loan contract stipulates the size of the loan per unit of the asset  l j and the interest rate ρ j for  j ∈ { 1, 2} . Given  c 3 and  p this pins down  q j , the quantity of the asset a bor-
rower can buy if matched with a lender of type  j . The haircut, the fraction of the posi-
tion in the asset that a borrower has to finance with his own capital  c 3 , is defined as
(1)  h j =  p −  l j  ____p .
We assume that a loan contract breaks down with some exogenous intensity; 
 neither borrower nor lender can cancel the contract in the meantime. In online 
Appendix G we prove the following results:
PROPOSITION 1: A loan contract will always be risk free from the perspective of 
the lender, i.e.,  (1 +  ρ j )  l j =  r _j .
In words, from the perspective of the lender, the payout in the bad state of the 
world will be sufficient to repay the loan, including interest. The intuition behind this 
result is similar to the one in Geanakoplos (2003). If the contract is risky, the lender 
expects to lose money in the bad state of the world. To compensate for this, he will 
charge a high interest rate in the good state of the world. In contrast, the borrower 
expects the lender’s losses to be limited in the bad state of the world. He believes the 
lender will be able to recuperate a large fraction of the loan, if not everything. As a 
result, the risky interest rate is disproportionally high from the borrower’s perspec-
tive. This makes risky borrowing unattractive. The optimal loan size will therefore 
not exceed the risk free amount. This implies that the interest rate  ρ j only captures 
surplus payments from borrower to lender and does not reflect risk compensation.
PROPOSITION 2: As long as  r _1 <  r _2 , we will have  h 1 >  h 2 .
All adjustment for risk happens through haircuts. Type 1 agents are more pessi-
mistic about the bad state of the world and since contracts are risk free, this results 
is smaller loans and higher haircuts.
PROPOSITION 3: As long as the valuations of type 1 and type 2 agents do not lie 
too far apart, specifically
(2)  r _2 <  p __________ a r _1 + (1 − a ) p  r _1 ,
with  a ∈ [ 0, 1 ] increasing in matching frictions, there will be a full matching equi-
librium, that is, a borrower will always accept a loan contract from a type 1 lender.
The type 2 lender is more optimistic and is willing to offer a bigger loan. There 
are two reasons a borrower accepts the type 1 loan and does not wait for a type 2 
agent. First, there are matching frictions and it may take a while for a borrower to 
run into a type 2 lender who is not tied up in an existing loan contract. This carries 
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opportunity costs. Second, the type 2 lender will capture a part of the surplus gener-
ated by a type 2 loan through charging a higher interest rate. If the advantage from 
waiting for a type 2 lender is not too big, as captured by equation (2), a borrower 
will always accept a type 1 loan.
B. Comparative Statics
In the context of the Seppenwolde default, we interpret the model as follows. 
Initially, beliefs of type 1 and 2 lenders are identical—they both think that the return 
in the bad state of the world is  r _. They only differ in the sense that type 1 lenders 
happen to lend to the Seppenwolde consortium. After the default, type 1 lenders 
update their beliefs such that  r _1 <  r _2 , where, for simplicity,  r _2 is unchanged at  r _. 
At the same time, due to a concurrent decline in asset prices, optimists lose capital. 
We model this as a reduction in  c 3 . To understand how this affects the equilibrium in 
the loan market, we derive the following comparative statics:22
LEMMA 1: The difference in haircuts is decreasing in  r _1 , that is
(3)  δ( h 1 −  h 2 )________ δ r _1  =  
δ h 1  ___δ r _1 −  
δ h 2  ___δ r _1 < 0 .
Loan contracts are  risk-free and when type 1 lenders become more pessimistic, 
h 1 will automatically go up such that  (1 +  ρ 1 )  l 1 ≤  r _1 . At the same time, as type 1 
lenders become more pessimistic, less funding becomes available for type 3 agents 
to purchase the asset and the equilibrium price falls. This leads to a decline in  h 2 and 
the difference between type 1 and 2 haircuts will increase. In other words, after the 
Seppenwolde default, we expect haircuts on loans made by exposed lenders to go up 
compared to haircuts on loans made by unexposed lenders.
LEMMA 2: The difference in haircuts is invariant to changes in  c 3 , that is
(4)  δ( h 1 −  h 2 )________ δ c 3  =  
δ h 1  ___δ c 3 −  
δ h 2  ___δ c 3 = 0 .
A drop in optimists’ capital reduces the equilibrium price. Equation (1) indicates 
that both  h 1 and  h 2 will fall, leaving the difference between the two unchanged. 
This means that the Seppenwolde default itself has no differential effect on haircuts, 
except through changes in beliefs.
LEMMA 3: The difference in interest rates can either be increasing or decreasing 
in  r _1 , that is
(5)  δ( ρ 2 −  ρ 1 )________ δ r _1  =  
δ ρ 2  ___δ r _1 −  
δ ρ 1  ___δ r _1 ≶ 0. 
22 To get closed form solutions, we evaluate all comparative statics at the point where  r _1 =  r _2 =  r _, tracing out 
what happens in response to a relatively small change in  r _1 . In online Appendix G, we use numerical analysis to 
consider the impact of larger shocks. In general, results are consistent. 
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The impact on interest rates is ambiguous. A type 2 loan will become relatively 
more valuable to borrowers and, compared to a type 1 loan, will command a higher 
surplus payment (surplus effect). At the same time, the size of a type 2 loan will be 
relatively large (size effect). The interest rate  ρ 2 is defined as the surplus payment 
divided by the loan size. Since both go up, the net effect is unclear and depends on 
the exact parameters of the model.
LEMMA 4: The difference in  semi-elasticities of type 1 and type 2 haircuts 
with respect to a change in  r _1 is larger (in absolute value) than the difference in 
 semi-elasticities of type 1 and type 2 interest rates:
(6)  | δ  h 1  ___δ  r _1 −  δ  h 2  ___δ  r _1 |  1 __h >  | δ  ρ 1  ___δ  r _1 −  δ  ρ 2  ___δ  r _1 |  1 __ρ,
where  h and  ρ are the initial haircut and interest rate corresponding to  r _1 =  r _2 =  r _.
The  semi-elasticities indicate by what percentage haircuts or interest rates will 
increase (or decrease) given a unit change in  r _1 . This lemma therefore states that, 
in relative terms, the differential impact of a change in  r _1 is larger for haircuts than 
for interest rates. The intuition is as follows. Since loan contracts remain risk free, a 
drop in  r _1 will have a first order impact on the loan size such that  (1 +  ρ 1 )  l 1 =  r _1 . 
The adjustment in interest rates is smaller as the size and surplus effects largely 
cancel each other out.
III. Data
The starting point for our data is the (incomplete) index to the Amsterdam 
notary records compiled by Hart (SAA 30452) with entries for English stocks. We 
use information from all notaries listed in the registry dealing with collateralized 
loans for the years 1770 to 1775.23 This yields a total of 424 loan transactions with 
English securities as collateral.24 We also collect information on margin calls (insin-
uaties), and accounts of settlement dealing with the liquidation of collateral.25 To 
calculate the haircut, we take the most recent price of the  corresponding  collateral 
in the Amsterdam market (available in the Amsterdamsche Courant). Table 2 pro-
vides an overview. The average loan value was 29,000 guilders, and the average 
collateral value was 36,000 guilders. For comparison, a skilled laborer could earn 
1.40 guilders per day at the time, while prime Amsterdam real estate (on the famous 
Heerengracht) cost around 10,000 guilders (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, 
graph 12.1; Bisschop 1968).
23 We found the majority of loan contracts in the archives of notary Daniel van den Brink. Wilson (1941) was 
the first scholar to use these records. 
24 For the period 1770–1775, there are very few notarized loans collateralized with other securities. We did not 
find a single loan on Dutch East (VOC) or West India (WIC) stock. There are occasional loans on securitized mort-
gages to  West-Indian planters or sovereign bonds issued by  Austria-Hungary. These observations are infrequent and 
there are no secondary market prices available to calculate haircuts. 
25 Of these 424 transactions we omit six loans from our econometric analysis. Four loans were collateralized 
by rare, infrequently traded British government securities for which no prices are available. For two  post-1772 loan 
transactions, lenders rolled over existing margin loans at artificially low haircuts instead of liquidating the collateral. 
These two observations belong neither to the treatment or control groups. 
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Panel A of Table 3 presents information on the lenders, distinguishing those with 
and without exposure to the consortium. Categories overlap and totals do not add 
up to 100 percent. Around one-half of the lenders were merchants. Another one-
half were  rentiers. One-third of the lenders were government officials or judges. 
Another one-third were noblemen. Around one-fifth were women. Finally, a few 
lenders were specialists, i.e., individuals or firms who both lent and borrowed in the 
securities market. Lenders exposed to the Seppenwolde consortium were broadly 
similar to the rest. They were slightly more likely to be active in commerce or in 
local government, although the differences are not statistically significant.
Panel B presents information on borrowers, by the exposure of their lenders. 
Exposed ones lent less to specialists and Jews, and slightly more to merchants. The 
differences are small and mostly insignificant. We also reconstruct two risk mea-
sures for the borrowers. No detailed individual records survive. Instead, we rely on 
data from the ledgers of the Amsterdam Bank of Exchange. In the eighteenth century 
all Amsterdam citizens involved in commercial transactions had a current account 
at this large exchange bank. The bank had a monopoly on the issuance of deposit 
money, with deposits largely backed by specie reserves (Van Dillen 1964). There 
were no bank notes and the only alternative form of currency was specie (man-
aged by small cashiers, Dehing 2012). To reduce transaction costs, large payments 
were usually settled through transfers between accounts in the Bank of Exchange 
(Quinn and Roberds 2014). Most of the Bank’s original, handwritten, ledgers still 
exist. They contain daily information about transfers between individual accounts. 
Based on this information we can reconstruct daily account balances and a borrow-
er’s gross transaction volume. This information is available for 57 out of a total of 
75 borrowers in our sample.26 In total, we hand collected information for about 
55,000 bank transactions between 1769 and 1775.
We use the information from the Bank’s ledgers to construct two time-varying 
variables. The first relates a borrower’s collateralized debt position to his or her 
overall activity in the bank; log(deb t i,t /transaction s i,t ), where the first term measures 
the total margin debt contracted by a borrower at a specific point in time (recon-
structed from our sample of loan contracts); transaction s i,t measures the average 
daily transaction volume for each borrower during the past year.27 This  variable 
26 The borrowers for whom we lack data did not live in Amsterdam and did not qualify for an account (Van 
Dillen 1964). They participated through the intermediation of cashiers or other agents. For borrowers who did have 
an account not all data are available because a number of the original ledgers are missing.
27 Due to missing  half-yearly ledgers we cannot always calculate annual averages based on a full year of data. 
We include the data point if the average is based on at least 150 daily observations. 
Table 2—Descriptive Statistics: Loan Contracts
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max
Real value of collateral (guilders) 418 36,271 27,734 4,782 238,058
Face value of collateral (£) 420 1,910 1,608 300 15,000
Loan value (guilders) 422 28,969 23,244 2,200 210,000
Haircut (fraction) 418 0.205 0.059 0.080 0.550
Interest rate (percent) 420 3.63 0.30 2.50 4.00
Non-EIC (BoE, SSC, 3 percent annuities) 422 0.256 0.437 0 1
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can be seen as a (noisy) proxy for  time-varying leverage. The intuition is that 
 transactions i,t captures a borrower’s total economic activity. If margin debt is small 
relative to the total volume of inflows and outflows, we consider a borrower safer: 
he will be less likely to default in case of adverse asset price movements. The sec-
ond variable measures the relative cash position of a borrower: log( balance i,t / 
transactions i,t ), where the first term is the average daily balance of the past year. 
This captures what fraction of transaction volume is financed through a borrower’s 
own account balance. The idea is that borrowers with strong cash positions are bet-
ter able to respond to margin calls. Earlier research (on the crisis of 1763) indicates 
that this variable is a good predictor of financial intermediary  distress in Amsterdam 
(Schnabel and Shin 2004; Quinn and Roberds 2015). We can reconstruct these two 
variables for about 75 percent of all loan contract observations. Panel B of Table 3 
shows that, before Christmas 1772, exposed lenders lent to borrowers who were 
riskier in both dimensions, although differences are not statistically significant. 
Online Appendix Figure B.5 plots these two risk measures for the consortium: their 
debt (cash) positions were always above (below) the sample mean. We show in 
online Appendix Table B.2 that the two variables have significant explanatory power 
for haircuts in our overall sample, and  pre-1773. We control for them in the main 
analysis.
Table 3—Lender, Borrower, and Loan Characteristics: Exposed versus Non-Exposed
Exposed Non-exposed t-Stat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Lenders
Merchants (fraction total) 44 (0.537) 29 (0.433) 1.258
Patricians (fraction total) 32 (0.352) 22 (0.286) 0.909
Nobles (fraction total) 26 (0.283) 26 (0.317) −0.493
Females (fraction total) 17 (0.185) 16 (0.195) −0.173
Specialists (fraction total) 3 (0.033) 3 (0.037) −0.143
Panel B. Borrowers
Merchants (fraction total) 33 (0.917) 16 (0.842) 0.833
Jews (fraction total) 15 (0.417) 10 (0.526) −0.767
Specialists (fraction total) 2 (0.078) 2 (0.105) −0.344
log( debt i,t / transactions i,t ) 3.923 3.643 0.543
log( balance i,t / transactions i,t ) 1.563 1.780 −0.573
Panel C. Loans
Haircuts (fraction) 0.198 0.199 −0.092
Lending volume (£ 000s) 1.890 2.064 −0.552
EIC (fraction) 0.843 0.555 5.244
Interest rate (percent) 3.763 3.526 7.773
Notes: Panel A: General characteristics of lenders who were exposed to the Seppenwolde consortium versus lenders 
who were not. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of Christmas 1772. 
Merchant: active in commercial activities; patrician: member of government or the judiciary; specialist: lender who 
also borrows. Columns 1 and 3 report total number of lenders; columns 2 and 4 fractions of the total (non-)exposed 
population. Reported t-statistics for the difference in fractions. Panel B: general characteristics of borrowers who 
obtained loans from exposed or non-exposed lenders (including the Seppenwolde consortium). Merchant: active in 
commercial activities;  debt i,t : total collateralized debt position borrower i at time t;  transactions i,t and  balance i,t : 
borrower i’s average daily transactions and balance in the Amsterdam Bank of Exchange during the preceding year. 
Panel C: general characteristics of the loans extended by exposed and non-exposed. Lending volume: measured by 
the face value of the collateral; EIC: fraction of loans collateralized with EIC stock. Data refer to 1770–1772 only. 
Reported t-statistics for the difference in mean between the two different subsamples. The  t-statistics in panel C are 
based on standard errors clustered at the lender level. 
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Panel C of Table 3 summarizes loan characteristics before Christmas 1772. Haircuts 
are virtually indistinguishable for exposed and unexposed lenders. The average loan 
size per transaction was nearly identical for exposed and unexposed lenders. Exposed 
lenders charged 23 basis points (BPS) higher interest rates and were more likely to 
lend against EIC collateral. For both, the difference is highly statistically significant. 
In the empirical analysis, we take these differences explicitly into account. Table 4 
analyzes loan transactions over time. Most of the loan contracts were signed before 
Christmas 1772. Lending to the consortium dominated, with 232 out of 362 loans 
taken out by the Seppenwolde group. After the crisis there was a strong reduction 
in the number of loan contracts, affecting both exposed and unexposed lenders. 
There is a significant exit of both lenders and borrowers, where  non-exposed lenders 
are somewhat more likely to exit the sample, the implications of which we discuss 
below. After Christmas 1772 there are 28 lenders in the sample, including one new 
entrant. A large number of borrowers disappear from the sample, but there is also 
significant new entry. After 1772 there are a total of 32 borrowers, one-half of which 
are new entrants. Affected and  nonaffected lenders extend the same share of loans 
to new borrowers. Finally, EIC stock dominates as collateral, but Bank of England 
(BoE) stock is also important. The consortium mainly borrowed to fund its EIC posi-
tion; unsurprisingly, exposed lenders mainly lent on EIC as well (about 84 percent). 
 Non-exposed lenders also lent on EIC but their share in BoE stock was higher (about 
28 percent). After Christmas 1772 both groups of lenders converged and mainly lent 
on EIC. Both for lenders and borrowers, we use family fixed effects. In most cases, 
such as for fathers and sons, families are the relevant unit of observation.28
IV. Main Results
In this section, we analyze the change in haircuts after 1772 and its causes. In 
addition, we explore other margins of adjustment, including interest rates. We show 
that lending behavior of exposed and unexposed lenders prior to the distress event 
was identical, and that only investors who were faced with possible losses changed 
their behavior.29
A. Haircuts
Former Seppenwolde creditors tightened their lending criteria after Christmas 
1772, while other lenders continued as before. We calculate average haircuts for 
exposed and unexposed lenders, before and after Christmas 1772 (Table 5). Exposed 
and unexposed lent at virtually the same rate before Christmas 1772; thereafter, the 
difference rose to 7 percentage points. Exposed lenders raised their haircuts from 
20.7 to 26.1 percent; unexposed ones lowered theirs from 21.1 to 19.3 percent. The 
 difference-in-differences is 7.3 percentage points, equivalent to approximately a 
 one-third rise relative to the  precrisis haircuts.
28 In other cases, family members were often involved in similar transactions with the same counterparties. 
When dealing with partnerships, we treat the individual partners and the partnership itself as one fixed effect. We 
often cannot distinguish between transactions that are done in a person’s own name or in name of the partnership. 
29 Exposed lenders are defined as lenders who sold collateral on the market. 
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In online Appendix Figure B.6 we plot distributions of haircuts for exposed and 
unexposed lenders, before and after the crisis episode. The left panel refers to unaf-
fected lenders, before and after Christmas 1772. The modal haircut for both periods 
is 20 percent; the somewhat thicker tails mainly reflect smaller sample size. The 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the difference in distributions is insignificant with a 
 p-value of 0.155. In the right panel, we plot the distributions for those affected by 
the Seppenwolde episode. Here, a distinct shift to the right is visible, statistically 
significant with a  p-value of less than 0.001, with the mode rising from 20 percent 
to 25 percent. After December 1772, many lenders insisted on 30 percent or more; 
previously, few had lent at a rate above 30 percent.
In panel A of Table 6, we analyze the effect of almost losing money in the 
Seppenwolde transactions on haircuts econometrically. We estimate the following 
equation:
(7)  Haircu t i,t, =  β 1 Expose d i +  β 2 Expose d i  ×  Post  1772 t 
 +  β 3 nonEIC +  ε i,t +  ζ i,t ,
Table 4—Number of Loans, Lenders, and Borrowers, and Collateral before/after Christmas 1772
From 
exposed
Loans 
consortium
Panel A. Number of loan contracts by period Yes No Yes No
Before Christmas 1772 217 145 232 130
After Christmas 1772  41  15  56
Number of
lenders: 
exposed
Number of 
borrowers: from 
exposed
Panel B. Number of lenders and borrowers by period Yes No Yes No
Before Christmas 1772 92 82 34 38
After Christmas 1772 18 10 21 11
Number of new lenders/borrowers after Christmas 1772  1 12  4
Fraction of loans from/to new lenders/borrowers 0.11 0.44 0.40
EIC BoE Other
Panel C. Types of collateral used
lenders 
exposed
lenders 
exposed
lenders 
exposed
by period ( fractions) Yes No Yes No Yes No
Before Christmas 1772 0.84 0.55 0.14 0.38 0.01 0.06
After Christmas 1772 0.84 0.88 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.06
Notes: Sample characteristics before and after Christmas 1772. Panel A presents the number of new loans extended 
by type of lender and by whether loans were taken up by the Seppenwolde consortium. Exposed lenders are those 
who liquidated collateral after the default. Some loans taken up by the consortium were repaid before Christmas 
1772. This explains why the total number of consortium loans is larger than the number of loans extended by 
exposed lenders. Panel B lists the number of lenders and borrowers. We separately report the number of lenders 
who were exposed (yes or no). Borrowers are differentiated by whether they borrowed from exposed lenders. The 
panel also lists the number of new lenders and borrowers that entered the market after Christmas 1772. New bor-
rowers are differentiated by whether they borrow from exposed lenders. We also calculate the fraction of total lend-
ing extended by new lenders/taken up by new borrowers, e.g. 44 percent of all loans extended by exposed lenders 
after 1772 went to new borrowers. Total lending is measured in face value of the collateral. Panel C presents the 
type of collateral that was used in the loan transactions, again differentiated by whether lenders were exposed (yes 
or no). EIC is East India Company, BoE is Bank of England, Other includes South Sea Company (SSC) and gov-
ernment securities.
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where  ε i,t includes year dummies. In some specifications, we use lender and bor-
rower characteristics or fixed effects.  ζ i,t is the error term. We pool observations from 
all types of collateral, and control for asset type separately in our regressions. In 
column 1, we report pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) results with clustered stan-
dard errors clustered at the lender level. Exposed financiers lent with lower haircuts 
on average, but the difference is small and insignificant. Collateral other than the 
EIC was also associated with markedly lower haircuts. The variable of main interest 
is the interaction of being exposed with the  Post 1772 dummy (coefficient  β 2 )—the 
average change in haircuts after the default of the Seppenwolde syndicate for lend-
ers who almost lost money. The estimated shift for exposed lenders after 1772 is 7.6 
percentage points, significant at the 1 percent level. Relative to the  precrisis average 
of 21.9 percent, this is a dramatic change. In column 2, we add borrower and lender 
type dummies to account for the changing composition of the sample. The estimated 
coefficient is now 6.6 percentage points, somewhat smaller than before, and also 
highly significant. In columns 3 to 5 we include lender and borrower family/firm 
fixed effects. The panel is unbalanced and these fixed effects should control for 
possible changes in the composition of lenders and/or borrowers in the sample. In 
addition they capture unobservables at the lender/borrower level.30
One concern might be that the composition of lenders changed after Christmas 
1772. Suppose that lenders that specialized in riskier lending had a higher likelihood 
of staying in the sample. Also suppose that these lenders were more likely to extend 
credit to the Seppenwolde consortium  pre-1773. Such a particular change in the 
composition of lenders could drive our results. In column 3, we use lender family 
fixed effects and borrower type dummies to explicitly test for this. The coefficient on 
the interaction term is stable at 6.1 percentage points and significant at the 10 per-
cent level. This implies that the possible change in the composition of lenders is not 
responsible for our results.
Did affected lenders specialize in more risky lending after Christmas 1772, perhaps 
because they acquired particular knowledge during the Seppenwolde bankruptcy? In 
column 4, we use borrower family/firm fixed effects and lender type dummies. The 
coefficient on the interaction term falls to 4.0 percentage points, but is still signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that the possible  self-selection of exposed 
30 Table 6 reports the number of observations had we run a balanced panel. The inclusion of fixed effects implies 
a significant loss of observations. The fixed effect estimates should therefore be interpreted as robustness checks 
rather than benchmark estimates. 
Table 5—Simple Difference-in-Differences Estimate Haircuts (EIC Stock Only)
Before Christmas 1772 After Christmas 1772 Δ
Non-exposed 0.211 0.193 −0.018
Exposed 0.207 0.261 0.054
Δ −0.004 0.069 0.072
Notes: Average haircuts on EIC stock, by exposed and non-exposed lenders, before and after 
Christmas 1772. Haircuts calculated as the fraction of the collateral value not financed with 
a loan. Exposed lenders: those who were forced to liquidate collateral after Christmas 1772. 
Each observation is a new contract. Averages are weighted by the face value of collateral. The 
difference-in-differences estimate is in italics in the lower-right corner. 
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lenders into riskier borrowers cannot account for our results, to the extent that these 
risks are  time-invariant. In Section VB, we explore this further. In the final column, 
we include both borrower and lender family/firm fixed effects, to capture changes 
in lending rates that come from compositional change in the pool of both debtors 
and creditors. The interaction coefficient is somewhat larger at 6.3 percentage points. 
We also examine the potential role of differential  precrisis trends. Online Appendix 
Figure 1.A plots trends over time for exposed and unexposed lenders. There is no dif-
ference before Christmas 1772; it is only thereafter that haircuts diverge substantially.
B. Interest Rates
Next, we examine interest rates. In panel B of Table 6, we estimate the same 
specifications as before, using interest rates as the dependent variable. The model 
Table 6—Benchmark Estimates
OLS OLS FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Haircuts
Exposed −0.005 −0.003 −0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Exposed × Post 1772 0.076 0.066 0.061 0.040 0.064
(0.022) (0.023) (0.035) (0.024) (0.036)
Non-EIC −0.059 −0.056 −0.049 −0.052 −0.047
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.015)
Constant 0.219 0.245 0.244 0.211 0.190
(0.006) (0.017) (0.025) (0.012) (0.037)
R2 0.334 0.440 0.630 0.659 0.798
Panel B. Interest rates
Exposed 0.072 0.048 0.074
(0.036) (0.034) (0.041)
Exposed × Post 1772 −0.049 −0.034 −0.080 0.035 0.066
(0.099) (0.099) (0.132) (0.113) (0.217)
Non-EIC −0.078 −0.093 −0.085 −0.104 −0.078
(0.036) (0.034) (0.050) (0.049) (0.053)
Constant 3.527 3.637 3.674 3.559 3.792
(0.036) (0.096) (0.101) (0.071) (0.171)
R2 0.511 0.564 0.741 0.699 0.832
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender type dummies No Yes Yes
Borrower type dummies No Yes Yes
Lender FE No No Yes No Yes
Borrower FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 418 387 418 387 418
Observations (if balanced) 166  77  33
Number of lenders 177 152 177 152 177
Number of borrowers  72  70  72  70  72
Notes: Regression estimates for all English securities. Observations refer to new contracts and are weighted by the 
face value of the collateral. Haircuts are calculated as the fraction of the collateral value that is not financed with a 
loan. Interest rates are annual. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of 
Christmas 1772. Lender and borrower type dummies are as in Table 3. The interaction between the Exposed and the 
Post 1772 dummies captures the difference-in-differences effect. Lender and borrower fixed effects refer to fixed 
effects on the family/firm level. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender level) are reported in parentheses.
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in Section II predicts that the differential increase in perceived risk should mainly 
affect collateral requirements. Interest rates only reflect surplus payments and, 
according to the model, should be less affected than haircuts. Panel B shows that 
there is no significant differential change in interest rates after 1772. In the esti-
mates of columns 1–3 it is slightly negative, implying that exposed lenders charged 
lower interest rates after Christmas 1772. However, the coefficient is always eco-
nomically small and never significant. After introducing borrower fixed effects, the 
coefficient turns positive, but is still small and insignificant. Overall, these results 
indicate that interest rates were not used by exposed lenders to adjust for increases 
in perceived risk.31
Online Appendix Figure B.7 shows the development of interest rates over time. 
Interest rates charged by exposed and  non-exposed lenders track each other very 
closely, both before and after Christmas 1772. The figure indicates a shift to lower 
interest rates after Christmas 1772 that occurs for both groups of lenders.
C. Other Margins of Adjustment
Apart from haircuts and interest rates, we also examine other changes in lender 
behavior. First we consider the decision to continue lending. Overall exit rates were 
quite high (Table 4). Surprisingly, affected lenders were more likely to stay in the 
sample than unaffected ones.32 Online Appendix Table B.3 indicates that the dif-
ference in attrition between exposed and  non-exposed is not statistically signifi-
cant though. Among exposed lenders, those most heavily exposed to the consortium 
were less likely to stay in the sample, even if we control for total lending activ-
ity. Conditional on staying in the market, exposed lenders did reduce their overall 
exposure to collateralized loans. In Table B.4 we analyze both total lending (col-
umns 1–3) and lending excluding loans made to the Seppenwolde consortium (all 
before Christmas 1772) (columns 4–6). On average, those who were exposed lent 
more than the rest before the crisis (38,655 versus 36,917 guilders). Afterward, the 
exposed lenders who stayed in the market lent less (24,248 versus 28,286 guil-
ders)—a decline of 37 percent (versus 24 percent for  non-exposed lenders).
Next, we examine whether exposed lenders shifted toward less risky loans. 
Table 4 shows that after the Seppenwolde event, exposed lenders did not reduce 
the fraction of loans extended against EIC stock, the riskiest security. At the same 
time,  non-exposed lenders became more likely to lend on EIC and the differ-
ence between exposed and  non-exposed disappeared. There is evidence, however, 
that exposed lenders started to lend to safer borrowers. Panel A of Table 7 shows 
that riskier borrowers were more likely to exit the sample after Christmas 1772; 
panel B suggests that this is, at least in part, driven by the exposed lenders. Before 
the default of the consortium, they lent to borrowers with debt levels that were 
31 The summary statistics in Table 4 indicated that exposed lenders tended to charge 23 additional BPS to bor-
rowers before the Seppenwolde default. In column 1 of Table 6, panel B, this drops to about 7 BPS. This reduction 
is the result of the introduction of year fixed effects; exposed lenders happened to extend loans in periods with 
relatively high interest rates. When we control for lender and borrower type dummies the coefficient falls to about 
5 BPS and becomes statistically insignificant. 
32 One possibility, for which we only have anecdotal evidence, is that exposed lenders financed the positions of 
new buyers to shed EIC stock they now held. 
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about 8 percent higher in log terms; afterward, borrowers’ debt levels were 8 per-
cent lower on average. Log cash balances were 15 percent lower before the crisis, 
but about 5 percent higher afterward. This suggests that they preferred to match 
with less risky borrowers. To sum up, there is ample evidence that haircuts were 
not the only dimension of differential adjustment for exposed lenders, but the most 
important one overall.
D. Duration of Effects
How long does it take for beliefs of exposed and  non-exposed lenders to con-
verge? In online Appendix Table B.5, we add time elapsed since the crisis to our 
regression. We run the following specification:
(8)  Haircut i,t =  β 1  Exposed i +  β 2  Exposed i ×  Post1772 i +  β 3 TimeSinceEvent 
 +  β 4  Exposed i × TimeSinceEvent +  β 5 nonEIC +  ε i,t +  ζ i,t ,
where TimeSinceEvent is equal to zero before Christmas 1772 and equal to the time 
elapsed thereafter (in years). The interaction between the  Post 1772 and Exposed 
dummies captures the instantaneous differential impact on haircuts ( β 2 ). The inter-
action between the Exposed dummy and TimeSinceEvent measures the degree to 
which haircuts converge afterward ( β 4 ). To calculate the differential impact after 
six months, we can subtract 0.5 ×  β 4 from  β 2 . The estimates imply that within two 
years, the treatment’s impact has largely dissipated. However, since the number of 
observations falls over time, the decline in haircuts is not tightly estimated and not 
significant at standard confidence levels.
V. Alternative Explanations
In this section we perform a number of robustness exercises. We first show that 
exposure to the East India Company is not responsible for the change in lending 
terms. In addition, we demonstrate that time varying borrower characteristics and 
underlying lender heterogeneity cannot explain the patterns in the data. We also 
show that network effects do not drive our results. Finally, we show that results are 
not driven by the immediate aftermath of the Seppenwolde bankruptcy, and that the 
significance of our findings is robust to alternative estimation techniques.
A. Specialization in Risky Lending
The EIC’s stock price decline after September 1772 is the fundamental cause of the 
crisis episode we examine. Table 4 shows that individuals lending to the consortium 
were highly exposed to the EIC, suggesting that they specialized in (ex post) riskier 
lending, as demonstrated by the higher interest rates they charged. It is possible that 
the events of Christmas 1772 served as a general  wake-up call that collateralized 
lending was riskier than initially expected. The change in haircuts would then reflect 
a simple  risk-based adjustment, without any need for  personal experience changing 
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risk attitudes.33 To deal with this concern, we show that  distinguishing between 
lenders with a high vs. low ( precrisis) specialization in EIC stock, or charging high 
vs. low interest rates, does not affect our results. This is true in a standard regression 
setting; it also emerges clearly when we match lenders based on their  precrisis usage 
of EIC collateral and interest rates.
In panel A of Table 8, we first compare results for lenders with high vs. low 
exposure to EIC collateral before 1773. Those with high exposure raise haircuts 
by 4.8 percent; those with low exposure, by 6.7 percent. The difference is not sig-
nificant. We do the same for interest rates: those who charged low interest rates 
before increased haircuts by 3.7 percent. Those who charged higher interest rates 
raised haircuts by 9.3 percent. Again, this difference is not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, when we add interactions between interest rates and EIC exposure and 
the Post 1772 dummy in the full sample estimates, Exposed × Post 1772 remains 
economically and statistically significant at either the 1 or 10 percent level.34 There 
33 Note that the fact that lenders exposed to the Seppenwolde consortium charged higher haircuts is in line with 
this alternative interpretation. We thank an anonymous referee for pushing our thinking on this point. 
34 When we include interactions between the Post 1772 dummy and the interest rate and EIC share measure 
at the same time, the interaction with the Exposed dummy has a coefficient of 0.078, statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. 
Table 7—Borrower Attrition and Riskiness
Panel A. Attrition of borrowers after Including consortium Excluding consortium
Christmas 1772 (logit, 1 = exit) (1) (2) 
log( debt i,t / transactions i,t ) 0.048 0.055(0.043) (0.061)
log( balance it / transactions it ) −0.094 −0.104(0.056) (0.092)
Observations 41 39
Pseudo-R2 0.063 0.043
Panel B. Riskiness borrowers before/after log( debt i,t / transactions i,t ) log( balance i,t / transactions i,t )
Christmas 1772: exposed versus non-exposed (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposed 0.452 0.545 −0.172 −0.311
(0.222) (0.221) (0.139) (0.115)
Post 1772 0.327 0.905 1.360 1.114
(0.384) (0.448) (0.184) (0.514)
Exposed × Post 1772 −0.926 0.410
(0.680) (0.532)
Constant 3.972 4.193 3.882 0.930 0.642 0.819
(0.163) (0.112) (0.166) (0.112) (0.055) (0.097)
Observations 342 342 342 342 342 342
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.002 0.021 0.004 0.212 0.228
Notes: Panel A: logit estimates investigating whether a borrower drops out of the sample after Christmas 1772. 
debt i,t : total margin loan position borrower i at time t.  balance i,t ( transactions i,t ): average daily balance (transaction 
volume) of borrower i in the Amsterdam Bank of Exchange during the 52 weeks prior to time i. The table reports 
marginal effects, e.g., an increase in balance over transactions by 1 log point makes it 9.4 percent less likely that a 
borrower drops out of the sample. Panel B: OLS estimations at the loan level, investigating whether exposed and 
non-exposed lenders lent to different types of borrowers after Christmas 1772. Robust standard errors (clustered at 
the lender level) are reported in parentheses. 
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is some evidence that lenders specializing in EIC lending increased haircuts, but 
this does not drive the differential response of the exposed. Throughout, the table 
includes the interaction of collateral type and the Post 1772 dummy. The coefficient 
on this term indicates that haircuts on EIC did not increase after Christmas 1772.
An alternative approach is to use nearest neighbor matching to estimate treat-
ment effects on the treated. Panel B first shows the basic matching result for 
Exposed × Post 1772, where we derive propensity scores from the Exposed, Post 
1772,  Non-EIC, and year dummies. Column 2 adds the share of  EIC-based lending, 
 pre-1773, as a matching variable. In column 3, we use exact matching, restricting 
the estimator to only use comparisons with contracts by lenders who are in the 
Table 8—Lenders’ Risk Preferences
EIC share Interest 
<p(50) ≥p(50) <p(50) ≥p(50)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. OLS Estimates: sample splits and interactions
Exposed −0.003 −0.005 −0.005 −0.009 −0.009 −0.005
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005)
Exposed × Post 1772 0.048(0.055)
0.067
(0.033)
0.056
(0.033)
0.037
(0.032)
0.093
(0.035)
0.086
(0.027)
χ2 stat. 0.02 1.52
 ( p-value) (0.886) (0.217)
Non-EIC −0.052 −0.014 −0.055 −0.060 −0.053 −0.057
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006)
Non-EIC × Post 1772 0.040(0.048) −0.021(0.025)
0.019
(0.021)
0.023
(0.030)
0.024
(0.025)
0.021
(0.018)
EIC share/interest 0.005(0.013)
0.009
(0.015)
EIC share/interest × Post 1772 0.041(0.059) −0.134(0.061)
Objectives 188 199 384 189 198 381
Adjusted R2 0.383 0.259 0.417 0.481 0.349 0.428
Panel B. Nearest neighbor matching estimator
ATT 0.068 0.055 0.078 0.072 0.062 0.063
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026) (0.014) (0.012)
Additional matching variables
 Continuous x EIC share x Interest x x
 Exact x x Decile 
EIC share
x Decile 
Interest
Deciles 
both
Observations 418 415 415 412 412 412
Notes: Dependent variable: haircuts. Panel A: regression estimates for all English securities, weighted by the face 
value of the collateral. All specifications include year fixed effects and lender and borrower type dummies. The 
interaction between Non-EIC and the Post 1772 dummy captures any changes in haircuts on collateral other than 
the EIC. EIC share is the proportion of a lender’s loan portfolio before 1773 that is collateralized with EIC stock. 
Interest is the average interest rate charged by a lender before 1773. Sample splits above and below the median 
investigate what part of the distribution the effect is coming from. We report a χ2 test on whether the interac-
tion effect is statistically different. The interaction term with the Post 1772 dummy captures whether lenders who 
seem to specialize in risky lending (more EIC as collateral, higher interest rates) adjust haircuts differently after 
Christmas 1772. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender level) are reported in parentheses. Panel B: Nearest 
neighbor matching estimates using the face value of the collateral as weights, presenting the average effect for the 
treated. Matching variables always included: Exposed, Post 1772, non-EIC, and year dummies. Robust standard 
errors presented in parentheses. 
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same decile of  pre-1773 EIC exposure. Columns 4 and 5 apply the same logic using 
 pre-1773 interest rates. Finally, the estimates in column 6 rely on direct comparisons 
between lenders who are in same interest rate and EIC exposure deciles. In all cases, 
the results are highly significant and larger than 5 percent, indicating a large upward 
shift in haircuts among  closely matched lenders depending on whether they had 
lent to the Seppenwoldes. This strongly suggests that a simple reaction to risk is not 
responsible for the results that we find.35
B.  Time-Varying Borrower Characteristics
Including borrower fixed effects in our specification drives down the differen-
tial increase in haircuts after 1772 (Table 6, panel A, column 4), suggesting that 
borrower characteristics matter. In this subsection we control explicitly for time 
varying borrower risk measures. Exposed lenders tended to match with riskier bor-
rowers with larger debt positions and lower bank balances (Table 4).36 If, after the 
Seppenwolde default, lenders generally put more emphasis on risk measures like debt 
and cash positions, this would increase haircuts charged by exposed lenders automati-
cally.37 We therefore investigate whether  risk-related borrower characteristics became 
more important over time in determining haircuts. We use the two proxy measures 
derived from the borrowers’ bank account balances: log( debt i,t / transactions i,t ) and 
log( balance i,t / transactions i,t ), the amount of collateralized debt and a borrower’s 
cash position relative to its total commercial and financial activities. In addition, we 
use  time-borrower fixed effects, exploiting the (relatively limited) number of bor-
rowers who borrowed from both exposed and unexposed lenders after 1772.
Column 1 of Table 9 adds the two  time-varying risk measures to the specifica-
tion from column 4 in Table 6, panel A. Coefficients have the expected sign and are 
highly  statistically significant. An increase in margin debt from the  twenty-fifth to 
the  seventy-fifth percentile increases haircuts by 1.8 percentage points. A similar 
increase in a borrower’s cash position reduces haircuts by 3.4 percentage points.38 
Importantly, the coefficient on our interaction term is unaffected. In column 2, we 
introduce interaction terms between the Post 1772 dummy and the two risk mea-
sures. After 1772, lenders put more emphasis on cash levels; the coefficient almost 
doubles. At the same time, margin debt levels seem to have become irrelevant.39 
This reevaluation of risk slightly reduces the coefficient on Exposed × Post 1772, 
but it remains significant. As a further robustness check, we replicate these estimates 
including lender fixed effects in columns 3 and 4. Results are arguably stronger. 
In sum, borrower fixed effects and time varying borrower characteristics play an 
35 In online Appendix D, we examine a related possibility—that direct portfolio exposure to EIC price move-
ments was responsible for the paring back of risks. We also find no evidence for that. 
36 Panel B of Table 7 documents that though exposed lenders initially dealt with riskier clients, they started to 
lend to safer borrowers after 1772, suggesting that an increased emphasis on borrower risk characteristics cannot 
explain the differential impact on haircuts. However, these changes are not statistically significant. 
37 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
38 A fuller investigation of the impact of these two  time-varying measures is in the online Appendix Table B.3. 
39 When we estimate separate regressions for the period before and after 1772, we obtain a coefficient on the 
debt/transactions variable of 0.11 (SE 0.041)  pre-1772 and -0.014 (SE 0.05)  post-1772. In online Appendix Figure 
B.8, we illustrate the marginal effects of higher debt levels  pre- and  post-1772. 
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important role in determining haircuts, but accounting for them leaves the differen-
tial response of lenders to the Seppenwolde bankruptcy largely unchanged.
In column 5 we take the analysis one step further by including  borrower-time 
fixed effects. This specification should fully control for changes in borrower char-
acteristics. Effectively, we are identifying off those borrowers who borrowed from 
both exposed and  non-exposed lenders after Christmas 1772. This is the most strin-
gent test we can perform, but it limits the number of available data points. Only 
three borrowers were sufficiently active after Christmas 1772 to borrow from 
both exposed and  non-exposed lenders. In total, there are 16 unique combinations 
between borrowers and lenders that involve 13 different lenders: 8 exposed and 
5  non-exposed. These loan transactions constitute a quarter of all available observa-
tions after Christmas 1772 (details are in Table 10). The estimate of the interaction 
effect between the exposed and  post-event dummies is statistically significant at the 
1 percent level and the economic effect (5.4 percent) is similar to the benchmark 
estimates in Table 6, panel A.
C. Destruction of Relationship Capital
Can the need to find new business partners after Christmas 1772 explain the 
sudden increase in haircuts? If the Amsterdam market for collateralized loans was 
Table 9—Haircuts and Time-Varying Borrower Riskiness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exposed 0.001 0.002 −0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Exposed × Post 1772 0.052 0.045 0.101 0.077 0.054
(0.021) (0.019) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024)
Non-EIC −0.050 −0.051 −0.045 −0.047 −0.053
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.008)
log( debt i,t / transactions i,t ) 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.015(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
log( debt i,t / transactions i,t ) × Post 1772 −0.017 −0.023(0.009) (0.012)
log( balance i,t / transactions i,t ) −0.023 −0.021 −0.027 −0.026(0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015)
log( balance i,t / transactions i,t ) × Post 1772 −0.017 −0.018(0.008) (0.013)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender type dummies Yes Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Lender FE No No Yes Yes No
Borrower-time FE No No No No Yes
Observations 317 317 341 341 381
Adjusted R2 0.586 0.591 0.634 0.642 0.588
Notes: Dependent variable: haircuts. Regression estimates for all English securities. Observations refer to new con-
tracts and are weighted by the face value of the collateral. Exposed lenders are forced to liquidate collateral after 
Christmas 1772. The interaction Exposed × Post 1772 captures the difference-in-differences effect.  deb  t i,t : total 
margin loan position borrower i at time t.  balance i,t ( transactions i,t ): average daily balance (transaction volume) of 
borrower i in the Amsterdam Bank of Exchange during the 52 weeks prior to time i. Lender type dummies are as in 
Table 3. Borrower and lender FE refer to fixed effects on the family level. Robust standard errors (clustered at the 
lender level) in parentheses. 
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dominated by network lending, the Seppenwolde collapse could have depleted 
“intermediation capital” (Bernanke 1983). In that case, lenders needed to screen 
out new borrowers, using higher haircuts. We already argued that relationship lend-
ing was not central to the Amsterdam loan market. Here, we show that changes 
in haircuts over time for the exposed lenders cannot be explained by the destruc-
tion of “relationship capital.” First, we examine if exposed lenders saw a greater 
decline in repeat business than unexposed ones (Table 11). The probability of being 
matched with a repeat borrower fell after Christmas 1772. As the consortium exited 
the market and new borrowers entered, repeat business declined. This was true for 
both exposed and  non-exposed lenders. This implies that the relatively high haircuts 
charged by exposed lenders after Christmas 1772 cannot be the result of differen-
tially greater destruction of relationship capital.
Second, we start from the assumption that lenders that are heavily invested in 
a particular client relationship will have more concentrated portfolios. We then 
estimate
(9)  Haircu t i,t, =  β 1 Expose d i +  β 2 Expose d i  ×  Post  1772 t +  β 3 Herfi n i 
 +  β 4 Herfi n i × Post  1772 t +  β 5 nonEIC +  ε i,t +  ζ i,t ,
Table 10—Details of Borrower-Time Fixed Effects
Non-exposed Exposed
Lender Haircut
Face value 
coll. Type Lender Haircut
Face value 
coll. Type
Panel A. Borrower Nimweegen
Boreel 0.17 2,000 P,4 Aalst 0.22 1,000 M,9
Rutgers 0.18 1,000 M,8 Graafland 0.17 1,000 P,7
M,N,7 M,S,1
Straalman 0.18 2,500 Pereira 0.21 5,000 0
Steenis 0.25 4,000 P,F,8
Wtd. avg. 0.18 Wtd. avg. 0.22
Diff. 0.04
Panel B. Borrower Guttierez
M,9 M,P,1
Poorten 0.15 2,000 Berewout 0.23 1,000 0
Rutgers 0.30 1,000 M,6 Boddens 0.31 1,000 M,8
Straalman 0.30 1,000 M,N,8 Bors 0.31 2,000 N,F,8
Hagen 0.31 2,000 N/A,6
Wtd. avg. 0.23 Wtd. avg. 0.30
Diff. 0.07
Panel C. Borrower Tile
Winter 0.26 1,000 M,7 Boddens 0.26 1,000 M,10
Diff. 0.00
Weighted difference 0.05
Notes: This table documents the individual transactions that drive the  borrower-time fixed effects results. Information 
is restricted to the three borrowers who, after Christmas 1772, borrowed from both exposed and  non-exposed lenders 
(Jan Louis van Nimweegen, Olivier Guttierez and Penha, and Reinier Christiaan Tile). The left-hand side of the table 
shows lending transactions with exposed lenders, the right-hand side presents transactions with  non-exposed lenders. 
We aggregate information by  borrower-lender pair. All averages are weighted by the total face value of the collateral 
underlying a set of transactions. All collateral refers to EIC stock. Lender type: P – patrician, M – merchant, N – noble, 
F – female, S – specialist. Numbers refer to the decile of total lending each lender belongs to, e.g., P, 7 means that a 
lender is a Patrician whose total lending is in the seventh decile of the distribution of total lending activity.
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where  ε i,t includes time effects as well as borrower and lender characteristics,  ζ i,t is 
a random error, and  β 4 captures whether exposed lenders increased haircuts more 
if they engaged in more relationship lending  precrisis (a higher Herfindahl index). 
Online Appendix Table C.1 shows that this is not the case; if anything, a higher 
degree of concentration before Christmas 1772 (more relationship lending) lead to 
lower haircuts. This effect is not statistically significant.
D. Differences in Lenders’ Underlying Characteristics
Exposed lenders may have been differentially affected by the crisis. For example, 
if one type of lender had more exposure to the Seppenwolde brothers—say, those 
active in commerce—and their business was adversely affected by the turmoil of 
early 1773, then this could explain changes in haircuts. To control for this, we inter-
act observable lender characteristics such as occupation, status or gender with the 
 post-event dummy. The estimates are presented in Table 12. All estimates include 
lender and borrower type dummies (coefficients unreported). Estimated separately, 
we find that merchants lent at somewhat higher haircuts after 1772, while noblemen 
become willing to extend larger loans backed with the same amount of collateral; 
there is no significant interaction effect between the  Post 1772 dummy and the patri-
cian, gender, and specialist dummies. In column 6 we estimate the impact of these 
interaction effects jointly. Crucially, the interaction term (Exposed × Post 1772) is 
virtually the same as in the benchmark estimates of Table 6 (comparable estimates 
are in panel A, column 2: 6.6 percent) and slightly increases in the full specification 
of column 6.
E. Attrition
In a previous section we documented that exposed lenders were less likely to 
exit the sample after Christmas 1772 than unexposed lenders. Different rates of 
attrition could introduce selection bias in the haircut regressions. To test this, we do 
Table 11—Probability of Lender Matching with a Repeat Borrower
OLS OLS Logit Logit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 1772 −0.211 −0.196 −0.211 −0.209 −0.211 −0.207
(0.050) (0.108) (0.050) (0.110) (0.050) (0.104)
Exposed 0.026 0.020 0.021
(0.109) (0.086) (0.091)
Exposed × Post 1772 −0.018 −0.002 −0.006
(0.122) (0.196) (0.173)
Observations 224 224 224 224 224 224
Adj. R2 0.046 0.037
Notes: Dependent variable is a lender matched to a repeat borrower (one (s)he has lent to before) no = 0; yes = 1. 
Unit of observation: new loan contracts. To minimize measurement error of the repeat borrower variable, transac-
tions after Jan 1, 1772 only. Post 1772 is a dummy for contracts signed after Christmas 1772. Exposed is a dummy 
for lenders who were exposed to the Seppenwolde bankruptcy. We report marginal effects. Estimates should be 
interpreted as the change in the probability of being matched with a repeat borrower in response to a change in the 
dummy variables from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender level) in parentheses. 
3394 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW NOVEMbER 2016
two things. First, following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), we study whether the 
differential increase in haircuts is robust to the exclusion of those lenders that were 
more likely to exit the sample. We first estimate a probit model predicting whether 
a lender will stay in the sample, including the Exposed dummy, the total amount 
of lending before 1773, the relative exposure to the consortium and lender type 
dummies. We then rerun our regressions for lenders with progressively higher prob-
abilities of staying in the sample, rerunning our baseline regression (column 2 of 
Table 6, panel A). The idea is that as we move closer to a sample that only includes 
lenders that are unlikely to exit the sample, we get closer to the unbiased coefficient 
estimate. Figure 4 presents the coefficients on Exposed × Post 1772 and its 95 per-
cent confidence intervals. Overall, the coefficients do not vary significantly over 
the percentile range; if anything, they seem to increase. This suggests that sample 
attrition does not bias our coefficient upward.
F. Unobservables
Other unobservables could drive our results. While lenders exposed and unex-
posed to the Seppenwolde syndicate are broadly similar in many dimensions, it is 
possible that an unobserved, underlying factor is responsible for differences in risk 
appetite. To examine the possible empirical relevance of this issue we implement 
two additional tests.
First, we study the intensive margin of adjustment. If exposed and  non-exposed 
lenders differ on unobservables, it is likely that there are also unobservable 
Table 12—Haircuts and Lender Characteristics
Lender type M P N F S All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposed −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Exposed × Post 1772 0.062 0.068 0.062 0.064 0.065 0.061
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021)
Non-EIC −0.055 −0.056 −0.056 −0.056 −0.056 −0.056
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Lender type × Post 1772 0.033 −0.015 −0.040 −0.026 0.005
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.029) (0.047)
Constant 0.241 0.243 0.239 0.244 0.245 0.239
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lender type dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Borrower type dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 387 387 387 387 387 387
Adjusted R2 0.448 0.442 0.452 0.443 0.440 0.453
Lenders 152 152 152 152 152 152
Notes: Dependent variable: haircuts. Pooled OLS estimates for all English securities. Observations refer to new con-
tracts and are weighted by the face value of the collateral. Haircuts are calculated as the fraction of the collateral value 
that is not financed with a loan. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events 
of Christmas 1772. The interaction between the Exposed and the Post 1772 dummies captures the difference-in- 
differences effect. Lender and borrower type dummies are as in Table 3. Lender types: M(erchant): active in com-
merce; (P)atrician: member of (local) government or judiciary; N(oble), F(emale), (S)pecialist: lenders also active 
as borrower. Column 6 contains interactions with all lender groups. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender 
level) are reported in parentheses. 
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 differences between lenders who lent relatively small or large amounts to the con-
sortium. We test this in online Appendix Table B.6. Results indicate that lenders 
who, either in absolute or relative terms, lent more to the consortium did not change 
haircuts differentially compared to lenders who only provided relatively little credit. 
The interaction term with absolute exposure has a positive sign, but is statistically 
 insignificant and  economically small. A  one standard deviation increase in the abso-
lute position with the consortium around Christmas 1772 only raises haircuts by 
1 percent. The interaction term with the relative exposure measure has a negative 
sign and is also statistically insignificant and economically small. A  one standard 
deviation increase in the fraction of outstanding loans that were extended to the 
consortium decreases haircuts by 1 percent.
Second, we use the Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) method. We first estimate 
the interaction effect between the Seppenwolde exposure dummy and the  Post 
1772 dummy, without controls. Then, we  reestimate with controls, and examine 
the change in the interaction term. Assuming that unobservables are correlated with 
observables, this bounds their possible impact. If we use the EIC dummy and year 
fixed effects in the restricted model, and all categories of possible lenders and bor-
rowers in the unrestricted model, we obtain an Altonji ratio of 6.7, meaning that the 
attenuating effect of unobservables would have to be at least 6.7 times stronger than 
the effect of observable variables before our results become insignificant.40
40 If we estimate the restricted model without the EIC and year dummies, we actually obtain a negative result, 
implying that results get stronger as we add controls. 
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Figure 4. Impact of Attrition
Notes: This figure documents the impact of attrition following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008). We first run a probit 
predicting whether a lender will remain in the sample (see text for details). We then estimate the model of Table 6, 
panel A, column 2 excluding lenders with probabilities of staying in the sample below the xth percentile. The plot 
presents point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals.
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G. Excluding the First  Postcrisis Month
When the Seppenwolde brothers went bankrupt, there was substantial uncertainty 
about the consequences for market prices. Several lenders received collateral after 
margin calls were not met. In addition, there was  wide-spread concern in finan-
cial circles that only disappeared after the city’s  lender-of-last-resort facility opened 
in  mid-January. To examine if our results simply reflect illiquidity and uncertainty 
during the immediate  postcrisis period, we exclude all lending contracts signed in 
January 1773. This only marginally changes the results (online Appendix Table B.7): 
we still find an increase in the haircut charged by exposed lenders of  4–6 percentage 
points. This reduces sample size; combined with the fixed effect specifications, our 
results become (only borderline) statistically insignificant.
H. Collapsing Data Pre- and Post-1772
One  well-known problem of  difference-in-differences estimation is that standard 
errors can be understated, especially when the number of time periods is large rela-
tive to the number of units in the  cross section. To investigate this issue, we collapse 
our data into two periods only: pre- and  post-1772, as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, 
and Mullainathan (2004). Online Appendix Table B.8 reports the results. If any-
thing, the significance and size of the coefficient of interest increases, indicating that 
our panel analysis is not suffering from artificially small standard errors.
VI. Conclusion
One can only hope that reality will become more fashionable now [that] 
people are learning their lessons. 
—De Koopman (January 1773, p. 310)
Investor heterogeneity has important implications for asset pricing (Harrison and 
Kreps 1978; Heaton and Lucas 1995; Hong and Stein 2007). It may contribute to 
momentum, elevated trading volume, high volatility, and the formation of bubbles 
(Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong 2006). In addition, it can have a first-order impact 
on leverage in the economy. This has direct consequences for asset prices and for 
the amplification of shocks through the financial sector (Fostel and Geanakoplos 
2008; He and Krishnamurthy 2013). How different beliefs among investors arise 
is less clear. Recent research suggests that personal experiences may be an import-
ant source of heterogeneity (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2013; Malmendier and 
Nagel 2011, 2016).
In this paper, we examine a  well-identified case of large and  long-lasting changes 
in major market participants’ behavior. We analyze lenders who financed the equity 
positions of speculators in eighteenth century Amsterdam. Some of them were at 
risk of losing money when a syndicate of speculators went bankrupt; margin calls 
went unanswered, and collateral had to be sold. The episode could have spelled 
heavy losses. In actual fact, exposed lenders recovered all of their principal and 
interest. Nonetheless, those who almost lost money sharply increased their collat-
eral requirements in all future transactions. Lenders unaffected by the bankruptcy 
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largely continued to lend as before despite the fact that distress was observed by all 
participants. Overall leverage declined sharply.
Modern financial markets do not function exactly like the eighteenth century 
Amsterdam stock market, but there are important similarities. Collateralized lending 
continues to be a key feature of securities markets, and changes in leverage can have 
important consequences.  Search-and-matching also continues to be important—repo 
contracts are negotiated in OTC markets, for example. One important difference 
limits comparisons with the present, but aids identification: financial intermedia-
tion played no role in eighteenth century Amsterdam, whereas many of today’s key 
players are intermediaries. The fact that lending was strongly  procyclical in the past, 
even without obvious incentive distortions due to agency problems, strongly sug-
gests that changes to personal  risk-taking can drive changes in aggregate leverage.
We cannot determine exactly what caused the differential change in behavior. It 
was public knowledge that East India stock was more volatile, and returns more often 
negative, after 1771, and the ill fortune of the Seppenwolde syndicate was widely 
known. Nonetheless, only investors who almost lost money changed their behav-
ior. The salience of (potential) losses is one possible interpretation.41 Alternatively, 
exposed lenders could have learnt about their own ability to screen for investors 
able to meet margin calls. Yet another possibility is that exposed lenders rationally 
updated their beliefs, while unexposed lenders attributed their  superior performance 
to their own skill.42 All three channels would have lead exposed Seppenwolde lend-
ers’ beliefs to change more than those of unexposed lenders.
Strikingly, haircuts for exposed and non-exposed lenders converge only slowly 
in the years after 1772. Our results strongly suggest that individual risk-taking can 
change substantially as a result of personal experience, even without changes to 
wealth—and that such changes do not only arise among retail investors (Malmendier 
and Nagel 2011), but among sophisticated market participants as well. Importantly, 
we also show that personal experience can change investor behavior in a major way, 
causing significant shifts in aggregate outcomes such as market-wide leverage.
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